Using a difference-in-differences framework and micro data from the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1999Files ( to 2004, this paper estimates the impact that the 9-11 terrorists attacks had on the U.S. labor market outcomes of individuals with nativity profiles similar to the terrorists. We find that shortly after the attacks, the employmentpopulation ratios and hours worked of very young (ages 16 to 25) Muslim men fell. By 2004, most losses had begun to dissipate. The employment-population ratios and hours worked of older Muslim men experienced little deterioration.
After and Muslim ist identifies the difference-in-differences effect of 9-11 on the labor market outcomes of Muslims.
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Most of the effects are allowed to differ by the Muslim status. This is done to allow for the fact that some factors like the business cycle, and citizenship status, might have affected the two groups differently over time. Two recent reports by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee (Ibish and Stewart 2003) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR 2002 (CAIR to 2005 suggest that discrimination varied by location. However, other than using the state/region dummies and Muslim to "non-Muslim" population ratios as an index of their 6 visibility, no control is used for this variation across locations.
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The key to identifying the impact of the terrorists' attacks on Muslim labor-market outcomes is the proper construction of target and comparison groups. Previous studies use a limited set of target and comparison groups. We demonstrate that there are additional considerations when constructing these groups. First, the impact of 9-11 on the labor-market outcomes of Muslims and Arabs varies by age. New job-market entrants might have experienced different outcomes than experienced workers. Given the terrorists' profiles, younger
Muslims/Arabs may be more vulnerable to discrimination. 12 Second, the labor market outcomes of Muslims might have been affected by the laws and programs created after 9-11 as well as by the animosity and fear that emerged after 9-11. To operationalize these ideas, we create several target groups consisting of either Muslim men or immigrant men from Muslim-majority countries.
IV. Data and Results

We use the 1999 to 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation
Groups files. The micro data sample is restricted to men who at the time of the survey were 16 to 64 years old and were not enrolled in school. The construction of the target and comparison groups and some salient features of the samples are described below.
A. Target and Comparison Groups
Religious affiliation is the appropriate information for categorizing whether an individual is Muslim, but the CPS does not contain this information. However, the CPS contains the reference person's country of birth as well as their parents' nativities, which makes it possible to identify 1 st and 2 nd generation immigrants from most Muslim-majority countries. We use this nativity information to define whether an individual is Muslim. We think this is a good proxy for 7 determining whether an individual is Muslim. Evidence suggests that people did not discriminate against Muslims with much accuracy after 9-11. 13 News reports and other studies find cases where non-Muslims with Muslim appearances experienced work place backlashes. 14 In many instances, it is very difficult to distinguish Arab Christians from Arab Muslims by name and appearance.
Further, country of birth also links up with the US government's special registration program. Most of the Muslim-majority countries (except Turkey and Malaysia) were on the Department of Justice's "Special Registration" list. 15 In November 2002, the first in a series of call-in requirements was imposed on men from these countries. It required men from these countries to report and register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 19 We make this exclusion to keep the target groups' geographic concentration similar.
As the validity of the difference-in-differences approach largely depends on the comparison group's quality, we constructed three comparison groups. In developing the comparison groups, we attempt to select individuals who should not be impacted by post 9-11 intolerance but at the same time are similar to Muslims in terms of their observable characteristics. Ideally, unobserved factors contemporaneous to 9-11 should have the same effect on target and comparison group labor market outcomes.
Comparison Group outcomes typically decline shortly after 9-11 and recover by 2004. We attribute the decline in statistical significance to the greater variation in earnings and hours that must be explained compared to the simple binary employment variable.
In general, it is not clear from these basic estimates whether these adverse effects were caused by animosity towards Muslims, the laws/programs that followed 9-11, differences in labor supply, labor demand, and institutional characteristics of target and control groups. Our regression-adjusted difference-in-differences estimates attempt to account for these factors. Although large, the timing of these estimates corresponds to the year in which the reported number of civil-rights violations against Arabs and Muslims increased dramatically.
C. Regression Results
The fact that 16 to 25 year old men comprise a very small fraction of the entire sample potentially makes the value of our findings dubious. However, when the sample's upper age limit is extended to 29, we still obtain a 17.6 percentage point decline in relative employment for the broad target group (the effects for the narrow target groups were large and negative but not measured with precision). When we expand the sample to men aged 16 to 64, we find no change in the employment of these target groups associated with 9-11. 25 to 29 year old men leads to a large dampening in 9-11's impact.
Switching to hours worked, we find that immediately after 9-11, there was a relative decrease in hours worked for the youngest target group. This is consistent with the relative decrease in their employment-population ratio as we set hours worked to zero for men who are not employed. By 2002, the narrow target group's hours worked diminished by 17 per week relative to Comparison Group 1. For the broad group, the relative decrease was about 11 hours.
The decline in hours for the youngest Muslims persists through the end of 2004. The relative decrease was bigger for narrower groups (about 16 hours) than for the broad group (about 8 hours). It is possible that the elasticity of demand for young Muslims' labor increased after 9-11 due to rising animosity, fear, or legal stringencies. We find few statistically significant changes in hours worked for older Muslim men. Similar to the employment-population ratio estimates, the terrorist attacks appear to have had little impact on the hours worked of older Muslim men.
Weekly earnings have no distinct patterns that can be easily summarized. Shortly after 
VI. Robustness of Results
Our findings that the employment of very young Muslim men deteriorated after 9-11 can be questioned on several grounds. First, during the post-9-11 years, the relative decline in the employment-population ratios and hours worked of young Muslims was accompanied by a relative increase in their average earnings (conditional on employment) for Target Muslims, the number of observations is small. Third, the validity of our comparison groups can always be questioned. Fourth, the post-9-11 drop in the employment-population ratio of young Muslims might have been driven by a significant net emigration of non-citizen working Muslims who had to leave the US due to the anti-terrorism programs (e.g., deportation of certain types of non-citizens).
We address the first critique by estimating DD quantile regressions to show what appears to be a relative increase in the earnings of young Muslims can be attributed to employment loss 14 by men concentrated in the lower tail of the earnings distribution. To address the additional critiques, we use pseudo-intervention dates in the difference-in-differences models. We explore the possibility whether increased net emigration was driving the results, and whether our results are sensitive to the use of additional comparison groups.
Findings from Quantile Regressions
It is important to note that the earnings equations in Table 2 were estimated only for employed men. If job loss for younger Muslims after 9-11 was concentrated in the lower tail of their earnings distribution, average earnings conditional on working are biased upward. If this form of selection is large enough, it could generate an increase in the target group's average wage that exceeds changes in the control group's average wage, thus explaining our estimates in Table 2 . To assess the possibility of this type of bias, we estimate our difference-in-differences models using quantile regressions at the 25 th , median, 75 th and 90 th percentiles of the earnings distribution. An individual's earnings are set equal to zero if they are not employed. Relative to the control group, if a larger portion of low-wage young Muslims left employment after 9-11, we should observe our anticipated Muslim disadvantage at the distribution's lower quantiles. 25 This drop in earnings at the lower quantiles was accompanied with unchanged median earnings, which indicates that less-skilled and therefore low-earning young Muslims bore the brunt of the job losses, pushing their post 9-11 average earnings conditional on employment upward.
Findings from using Different Intervention Dates
As an identification check, we incorrectly specify the timing of the attacks. To do this, we estimate our difference-in-differences models for two sub-periods. The first uses data from January 1998 to August 2001 and the second uses data from September 2002 to December 2004). 26 For the pre-9-11 sub-period, we set the Post 9-11 dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation corresponds to a date after August 2000. For the post-9-11 sub-period, the dummy variable equals 1 if the data corresponds to a month after September 2003.
For the full set of observations that run from January 1998 to December 2004, we also use a "rolling" date strategy. Here we set the attack date at a particular quarter and estimate the difference-in-differences model. We move the date forward by one quarter and re-estimate the model. The models are estimated for Target Groups A, B and C and comparison group 1. 2004. In other words, this second set of months is not independent of 9-11's effects. Consistent with the relative drop in employment, Table 5 also shows that hours worked decreased by 8 to 16 percent for the youngest group and the effects worsen as one moves from the broad to the narrow group. We find a similar pattern for the 16-to-29 year olds (Appendix III). However, only a 10 percentage-point decrease in the broad target group's employmentpopulation ratio is found when the longer time-window is considered. For 16 to 64 year old men (Appendix IV), we do not find a significant drop in employment at any "pseudo" intervention date. The above results confirm our earlier conclusions that employment deteriorated for the youngest members of the target group and the effects were short-lived, and older Muslim men were not heavily impacted by 9-11.
The earnings regressions using the rolling intervention dates yield results consistent with the 1999 to 2004 estimates in Table 2 . 
Did Muslim Net Emigration from the US Explain their Labor Market Outcomes Deterioration?
After 9-11, there is some evidence of increased net emigration of both target and comparison group individuals. We estimated the population of the two immigrant groups from the CPS-MORG files. We find that the number of immigrants from both the Special Registration countries and other countries was stable over this period. In fact, both groups experienced slight To check whether non-citizen emigration had any effect, we re-estimated the difference-in-differences models but restrict the Target Group C and Comparison Group 1 samples to US-citizens. We find that the estimates increase only slightly. If net emigration occurred mostly for employed non-citizen Muslims, our estimates are biased upward. However, the opposite scenario (e.g., increased net emigration of non-employed Muslims after 9/11) seems more plausible in which case our estimates are biased downward.
Using US-Native Men as Comparison Groups
As mentioned earlier, native-born men are not as good a comparison group as "nonMuslim" immigrants because the target groups differ from natives in terms of language proficiency. To assess whether this is true, we construct two additional comparison groups:
Group 2 (US-born men other than members in target groups) and Group 3 (US-born non-Latino White Men other than members in target groups). The same regression models are estimated with these comparison groups. 30 The estimates using the US-born men as comparison groups are similar to those using immigrants from non-Muslim countries. However, they are often not statistically significant. 
VII. Summary and Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive set of estimates of 9-11 and the associated antiterrorism measures' impacts on the labor market outcomes of Muslim men. Using a natural experiment framework, we find that labor market outcomes worsened for men with nativity profiles closer to the terrorists. Employment losses are greatest and longest in duration for very Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis of an emergence in discrimination against minorities that more or less fit the Muslim stereotype after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. However, the labor market's legal environment became relatively rigid for first-generation immigrants at least for a short period after 9-11. Because of these simultaneous changes, it is difficult to disentangle how much of the effects on labor market outcomes were caused by discrimination and how much by anti-terrorism legislation.
Two pieces of evidence are suggestive of a growth in discrimination against immigrant men. First, Muslims with age and nativity profiles closer to the terrorists' experienced larger declines in their employment. Second, the decline in employment and earnings of Muslims associated with 9-11 began to dissipate after 2002, just when some of the salient anti-terrorism programs and laws were initiated. Furthermore, the fear of discrimination might also have 20 discouraged some minority workers from labor market participation. 
(20.9)
Notes: Entries are difference in difference estimators based on the cell means in Appendix II. Target and Control group definitions are reported in Appendix I. A "**" denotes significance at 1% level. A "*" denotes significance at the 5% level, and "+" indicates significance at the 10% level. Notes: For earnings and hours worked models, robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. Statistical Significance: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. For employment-population ratio, the effects are difference-in-differences of probabilities predicted by probit models. The difference-in-differences effects were predicted for each individual separately. Standard errors shown in parentheses were calculated using the delta method. Explanatory variables were Muslim, 9-11 dummy variable, race and ethnicity, state, potential experience, potential experience-squared, educational attainment, citizenship, length of time in US, generation, and a cubic time trend. all explanatory variables were interacted with + means significant at 10%; * means significant at 5%; ** means significant at 1%. For Unemployed and Out-of-Labor force individuals, log-earnings was assigned a value of zero. The effects of divisions, unemployment rates, state per-capita incomes, occupations and educational attainment were allowed to vary by the target group. Target Group C consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from all but two Special Registration countries. Comparison Group 1 consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants excluding those from countries in Target Group C, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and "Other-Africa. Numbers show the difference-in-differences effects from the models with a pseudo 9-11 date. We took the monthly data from January 1998 through August 2001 and used September 1999 as the month after which the "Post 9-11" dummy was assigned a value of one. Models were run for target groups A, B and C and comparison group 1. Robust Standard errors clustered by repeated observations are in parentheses. Statistical Significance: + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% . Effects on Earnings and Hours worked were given by OLS regressions and effects on Employment were from probit models. None of the estimates are statistically significant. Notes: Each regression uses 6,149 observations. Robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. A "+" denotes significance at 10%. A "*" denotes significance at 5%, and "**" denotes significance at 1%. Explanatory variables are potential experience, experience-squared, state-unemployment rates, cubic-time trend, state-level ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim populations and dummies for Muslim, After-9/11, races, states, education, citizenship status, length of stay and generation in the US. Explanatory variables were interacted with the Muslim dummy variable. Special Registration countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan. Comparison Group consists of 1 st and 2 nd generation immigrants excluding those from the Special Registration countries, Mexico Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and "Other-Africa". Appendix I: Target and Comparison Group Definitions Muslims: Immigrants from Muslim-majority countries.
TARGET GROUPS:
Target Group C (the Broad A "+" denotes significance at 10%. A "*" denotes significance at 5%, and "**" denotes significance at 1%. Explanatory variables are potential experience, experience-squared, state-unemployment rates, cubic-time trend, state-level ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim populations and dummies for Muslim, After-9/11, races, states, education, citizenship status, length of stay and generation in the US. Explanatory variables were interacted with the Muslim dummy variable. Special Registration countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan. Comparison Group consists of 1 st and 2 nd generation immigrants excluding those from the Special Registration countries, Mexico Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and "Other-Africa". number of hate crime/discrimination incidents reported in a state; number of hate crime/discrimination incidents per Arab population in a state; and number of hate crime/discrimination incidents per state population. While the first two capture the risk of discrimination Arabs and Muslims face in a state, the third is an indicator of the prevalence of prejudice among the non-Arab population. Prior to October 2001, value of hate-crime index was assumed to be zero in all states. They estimated the results using all three indices and found the effects of all of them to be statistically insignificant. Due to the insignificant effects and the limited nature of the data, we do not include the indices in the analyses. 12 There has been no study on whether the 1 st generation immigrants were affected more than the 2 nd -generation immigrants. Anti-terrorism laws and programs targeted primarily those 1 st generation immigrants who are not US citizens, especially those who are not residing or working legally in the US. A fraction of the 1 st generation immigrants in the CPS datasets should be illegal immigrants. Demographic research suggests that at least a fraction of the illegal immigrants are in the CPS since the number of immigrants enumerated by the survey (and by the decennial Census, upon which the CPS weights are based) exceeds estimates of the number of the foreign-born legally present in the U.S. generation are similar between target groups and comparison group 1 (around 60% are 1 st generation immigrants). Special registration and other similar legal requirements ensuing from 9/11 were targeted towards the first generation immigrants. If legal rigidities have had negative impacts on some group of workers (conditioning for other factors), one should find negative outcomes for the older Muslims (age 26 and up), as most of them are 1 st generation immigrants. 23 They are available upon request. 24 For the employment regressions, the difference-in-differences of employment-ratio was predicted for each observation separately and the mean of all the difference-in-differences is reported for each age-range under each target group in table 3. Standard errors were estimated for each prediction and the mean of those standard errors is shown in parentheses. 25 The quantile regression results for the in-between group and the narrow group are available from the authors on request. 26 Notice that the second set of months should start sufficiently long after 9-11, i.e. after the effect of the event dissipates. 27 The results for the post-9/11 time window, i.e. the second set of months are available from the authors on request. 28 We used nine intervention dates for the 1999-2002 time window. September 2001 and January 2002 interventions yield the largest relative drops in the employment of the youngest members of the target groups. The drops are around 30 to 35 percentage points and are statistically significant. If is worth mentioning here that for the narrow target group, the unadjusted regressions show nearly 14 to 18 percentage-point relative drops in employment after 9-11 for this shorter time-window. We used a shorter time-window, 1999 through 2002. Intervention dates close to 9-11 yield bigger employment effects for 16 to 25 year old Muslims 29 Results available from authors on request. 30 Regression estimates from using US-born men as comparison groups are available from the author on request. In regressions that included comparison groups 2 and 3, we drop citizenship status and length of stay variables to avoid multicollinearity problem.
